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Political Parties and Political Corruption
in Comparative Historical Perspective

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in Comparative Historical Perspective**

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INTRODUCTION*

Seeking to identify and compare relationships between party finance processes and political corruption poses many problems, and the basic assumption underlying this paper is that one way of illuminating them is to utilize a very broad canvas. At a time when much is made of time series data that encompass only a few years, it is well to try to understand how perceptions of corruption have varied in Europe and America since the initial appearance of modern mass parties. It is also good to utilize opportunities to align recent provocative developments in Europe with a sampling of non-Atlantic democratic political systems. Mainly I will attempt to sketch a framework of analysis, and to suggest tentative interpretations of particular national or institutional placements and locations.

* * *

We can start by asking what kind of connection conventional political science wisdom at the turn of the 20th century perceived between political party finance and political corruption, and where the two phenomena were most closely linked. The answer is that both Europeans and Americans felt that corruption was most highly nurtured through the patronage based party machines in America. Whereas writers like Michels discerned the emergence of party machines in German Social Democrat and similar parties, in America tendencies toward disciplined party organizations were then undermined by the progressive movement and the wave of legislation that it initiated.

Around 1900 the American reform coalition mounted a frontal attack against parties and their corporate allies, and was able to stop the party controlled flow of legislation. This occurred almost simultaneously with the creation of the "bastard in the party state" (Skowronek) as a consequence of the belated Civil Service reform. Consequently the initiation of political finance limits and publicity culminated a quarter century during which the American party system seemed about to be propelled into a trajectory following the British, but then spun off into a quite different direction with the diminution of the power of party leaders through the imposition of party primaries, and the reliance on publicity as a control mechanism.

It would be fruitful to project what European party theorists like Ostrogorski and Weber might have prognosticated around 1910 about how party

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finance and political corruption would come to be linked. Max Weber acknowledged parties as vectors of the political system, but followed Ostrogorski's critique in lamenting the persistence of public office patronage within the lower levels of American administration (Senigaglia, 179).

Weber's insistence on sharply distinguishing between the roles of politicians and bureaucrats might have led him to accept the relative expansion of campaign fund raising by both parties and individual party candidates. He was more for strengthening the party organizations, but he also would have wanted to seek to avoid the alternative varieties of intermixing of party political and bureaucratic careers and domains which later came to be associated in varying degree with the party-state development in countries like France, Germany and Italy. Ostrogorski preferred the British model in part because of its lower corruption levels (Senigaglia, 164).

It was only after World War I that most European countries came to have fully developed mass parties based on unlimited adult suffrage. In America earlier Progressive legislation reducing the power of party hierarchies was followed by limitations on party finance practices which in 1925 were adopted as the Corrupt Practices Act. Thus the corruption labels of the Progressive period remained in use in inter-war America, in good part with regard to monitoring electoral practices. This was scarcely the case in the Continental European countries, where the banner of exposing politico-financial scandals was waved mainly by anti-democratic parties of the Right, as in the attacks on Matthias Erzberger in Weimar Germany. If today we scarcely find it possible to reconstruct objective indicators of corruption for this period it is in part because, from the democratic perspective, potentially corrupt behavior patterns came to be eclipsed by, or intertwined with, the widespread reliance on violence and intimidation in the struggle among mass parties of various types. As to corruption in non-Western areas, can one imagine an anti-bribery treaty being placed on the agenda of the League of Nations?

With different accents the relative neglect of corruption as a major national political issue continued into the post-World War II period. The continuation of various kinds of economic and credit controls probably served to "fudge" tracers of corrupt practices, while in the United States the kind of parochial corruption committed by, for instance some officials of the Truman administration, was overshadowed by larger issues of the Cold War. Since cross-national secret transfers of funds was one of the ways in which the pro-capitalist side aided European parties in the struggle against communism, it was not likely that their allied media in Europe or elsewhere would highlight illegal party finance practices as issues of political corruption. During the 1940's and 50's there was only limited American-European comparison or invidious

contrasting to highlight just how funding of parties and candidates violated rules against the mixing of public and private interests. When observers wrote about the “Americanization” of some European party systems, or when Kirchheimer wrote about the displacement of mass by catch-all parties, they usually did not strongly emphasize corrupt expenditures. The spin-off pattern that would catapult campaign costs, and diminish reliance on dues income from party members, was largely yet to come.

Although the American campaign legislation which introduced limits on campaign contributions and publicity requirements was characterized by “faulty conception and casual enforcement”, it was held to set standards in contrast with which the objectives of British legislation “were modest” (Heard, EB, 1959, 549-50). The only other European corrupt practices legislation briefly mentioned by political scientists in the 1959 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* was the French legislation of 1913/14 (Gosnell, *ibid* 124).

Although scarcely as well documented as some other phenomena from that decade, it was during the 1960’s that social scientists began to examine both party finance and political corruption phenomena on a less nation-bound and parochial basis. At the start of that decade the basis for internationally comparative research was established through the creation of a committee on Party Finance and Political Corruption of the International Political Science Association. But the numerous scholars who came to pursue research presented to meetings of that body continued in a tradition of distinguishing rather sharply between, in the main, socially acceptable ways of financing political parties, and patterns of political corruption. Papers and books analyzed topics under one of the two categories, not both. For several decades there were virtually no attempts to simultaneously examine linkages between party finance processes and explicitly recognized patterns of political corruption. (Leibfried, Rhodes).

Attempts to develop definitions of corruption across language and cultural boundaries based on Anglophone definitions made some headway in the emerging literature but were not completely successful. If there are still today the strong differences in the prevailing national core notions of corruption, what are these due to? Since legal definitions often loom so large, do embeddings in common law or code law traditions make considerable difference?

By itself, legality provides an inadequate criterion for cross-national comparison. For party finance practices provide a generally striking example of, “What is illegal in one country may not be in another, leading to situations in which similar acts may be defined as corrupt or not according to where they take place?” (Heywood, 1997, 7) Whether and by how much party campaign expenditures have exceeded prescribed limits have been at issue, but they have

not played a decisive role in the heated European discussion of linkages between party finance and political corruption which has occurred in the 1990's.

From this vantage point one might seek to identify just which group of developed countries have hosted the revelations and recognitions that have giving rise to alternative perspectives from the conventional ones mainly developed in the Anglophone literature? It seems that new relationships between the judiciary and the media are in process of crystallizing some new perspectives in countries like France and Spain, which have inherited certain elite privileges in prefecturally based bureaucratic systems. It is probably not accidental that some of the party leaders who have been found guilty of corruption have been big city mayors and others who have benefited from dual or triple mandates, which have shored up their party positions.

For theoretical perspectives that would help generalize about the party finance/corruption problem, a more likely set of countries are the trio of Germany, Italy and Japan. While the latter two have been often been discussed in tandem because their party systems both unraveled due to corruption revelations during the 1990's, there have been fewer attempts to analyze why Germany party system was less drastically affected.

Apart from their heritage of renewing democratic traditions under post-1945 occupation tutelage, the emergent political systems of these three countries subsequently had in common long periods of dominance by conservative parties. Their electoral systems encouraged varying degrees of factionalism, and these countries also exhibited considerable differences with regard to their party laws, tendencies toward effective inter-party competition, public financing of parties and campaign use of private media, and the monitoring role of public prosecutors and especially their constitutional courts.

These factors conditioned the degree to which party financing activities within the three party systems led to the incidence of extensive political corruption cases. Corruption here is conceptualized under the "abuse of public office for private profit" definition, not under the less restrictive "abuse of public office for party advantage" definition.¹

Significant for the developments were the different occupation period lags before party politicians in national parliament held significant decision making power. This occurred earlier in Japan, where large scale corruption scandals erupted at a time when German politicians presided over only limited power in Land governments. Election laws adopted in Japan and Italy permitted or even encouraged organized intra-party factions. The delayed West German development gave the national party leaders, better opportunities to control and

monitor their party followers. The concern of business leaders not to allow flagrant corruption cases to enflame anti-capitalist sentiments, led in all three countries cases to the evolution of mechanisms through which political contributions were funneled through associational channels. But due to the early German implementation of both the parties law and an effective constitutional court, the subsequent German development was distinctive because of the immense amounts of litigation and legislative energies that came to be devoted to monitoring the boundary between legitimate party financing and illegitimate corrupt and political exchanges.²

In contrast to Italy whose 1974 Parties Law seems never tested for constitutionality by its highest court, and to Japan which long did not have one, the German party law and related legislation were subject to intensive and repeated scrutiny by the Constitutional Court (BVG) from the 1950's to date. As West Germany became the European pacesetter in public party subsidies, the repercussions of alternative subsidy formulas on the equality of chances of both citizens and parties were examined by successive generations of judges with excruciating dexterity. Hordes of party law specialists became adroit in the ritualistic dance steps which came to constitute a republican substitute for the ballet performances that had once graced the Archducal palace in Karlsruhe. It was in the context of such a highly refined network of rule-making, rule-testing and rule-adaptation that the charges of high level corruption involved in the Flick scandal exploded in the 1980's. What the handling of this case showed about the prevalence and punishment of political corruption has remained in sharp dispute.

Did the court in its 1989 decision increasing (in effect) the permissible monetary limits of party donations, legalize activities which had been potentially criminal, and lead to actively exculpate those politicians whom the media had found guilty of trading ministerial decisions for party donations? This complex snapshot may capture how the court set a moving stage in front of which German audiences were enabled to judge whether their leading party politicians had transgressed, according to intuitive perception the boundaries delineating between the zones of white, gray and black corruption.

When in the early 1960's public financing of parties was first discussed as an alternative to the reliance on associational funding from business, the President of the German Industrial Federation, Berg, angrily told a journalist that he would be quit happy if all parties were financed by the state, because "then we in industry can save a lot of money, for we could then go out and simply buy the number of deputies which we require." (Heidenheimer/Langdon) Twenty years later the Flick case achieved notoriety because the donations came directly from the Flick firm to top party leaders and

ministers, with plausible links to tax policy outcomes directly benefiting the firm. The transactions were potentially illegal, because ministers were subject to the same rules as the civil servants, and not those of parliamentarians.

Writing much later, a sociologist judged that the financing pattern which Berg defended allows the establishment of clientelistic relationships between donors and politicians and lends itself the out right bribery" (Blankenburg 1989, PC, 115). But in 1985, all members of the BVG Senate which heard the Flick case, and all except one member the *Bundestag* committee which examined the charges subsequently, agreed that the donations did not fall afoul of the legal rules relating to either the bribery or the corruption criterion. The only dissident was a Green Party committee member named Otto Schily (now in office as Minister of Interior) who in a dissenting opinion said it constituted a clear case of political corruption³.

When the Italian public was confronted in 1993 by the Milan revelations which triggered the *mani pulite* investigations, it had not had the benefit of such prolonged tutoring in the legal conditionality of political exchange relationships. They had been alerted through the 1988 CENSIS study that widely prevalent administrative corruption of 136 trillion Lira a year (Landfried, 244). The contract kickbacks involved went partly to private pockets, but largely into party treasuries. The greater need for these was partly due to the fact that whereas public subsidies were covering an increasing share of German party expenditures, the equivalent ratio was decreasing in the Italian case.⁴ (Landfried, 116) Thus the illegal contributions from public and other companies were estimated to have totaled as much as the public subsidies, and later on, several times as much as these. (Bardi/Morlino, 260)

Most unique in the Italian use of corruptly gained funds , in European comparison, was the way in which these were used to buy membership cards by the various party factions, Thus the subtlety of clientelistic networks was accompanied by the apparently crude purchase of intra-party power (Dellaporta and Vannucci, 118-9), in ways that surely were not paralleled in the German or other north-European cases, where centralized party leadership generally was able to force factions to sublimate their conflicts. Within the PSI by contrast, *truppe cammellate* were mobilized by *falanges* of competing factions. (Rhodes, 71) If all was fair in love and war, then it seems easier to intuit why ethical imperatives were so much easier to evade in everyday Italian political life.

For those who employ a broad corruption definition, the breaching of legal limits of who could give how much to political parties, made the bulk of these illegal contributions subject to being counted toward corruption totals. In the Italian and also in the American cases, much of the money labeled as corrupt

seems so regarded not as the result of proven quid-pro-quo patterns, but mainly as the consequence of violations of political funding rules and limits had been adopted as part of political finance reform legislation, such as those of the 1970's.

Where locus of the German debate differed was that in the later period the debate about the legality of various practices centered in a more crucial way on the question of whether the funding practices violated the "Equality principle" which guaranteed citizens equal voice in political decision-making. Attempts to make similar grounds prevail in the American debate were stymied by the Supreme Court's *Buckley v Valleo* decision of 1976, which gave the First Amendment guaranteed rights of free speech priority over the weighting of wealthier voters through their donations. In the aftermath of the Flick case, the BVG was also accused of weakening its equality stand by accepting higher donor limits. Subsequently it seems to have tried to correct this by the 1992 decision in which it required a lower donation limit and outlawed tax deductibility of corporate contributions (but also did away with the special equalization fund, which proved quixotic in implementation).

European Party Corruption Links of the 1990s

From the late 1980's the classification of which relations between business, public enterprises and parties that could be considered corrupt underwent widespread change in Europe. In some ways the heightened critical perspective was reminiscent of what had occurred in the US during the progressive period around 1910. Lacking genuine Europe-wide media, there were however national differences to whether the presumptions of corruption were originated by academic or judicial public interest groups or authors, and also in whether and how the corruption focus was emphasized.

Others can testify as to how much the Italian revelations originating in Milan had played a key role in triggering initiatives like the Geneva Appeal, which sought to encourage prosecutors and magistrates in the Latin countries to persevere more rigorously against political constraints on the scope of their investigation, thus taking a leaf from the successes of their Italian colleagues.

In Germany the investigatory thrust of the 1990's turned up more cases of mundane, apolitical bureaucratic corruption at the municipal level. Another German media theme of party abuse of public office turned the focus more on allegedly excessive parliamentary salary perquisites, which however were generally distinguished from corruption (Arnim) In Germany, as in America,

there were differences among groups of social scientists as to who should lead the public attacks on bastions of corruption and special privilege⁵.

National Party Finance and Corruption Rankings

Among the early comparative party finance publications was the series of articles published in the *Journal of Politics* in 1963 which included articles on party finance in eight countries. There was also summary article, "Notes On Practices and Towards a Theory," in which I developed indexes of campaign expenditures for nine countries, mainly those covered in articles in that issue. The best estimates of campaign year party expenditures were translated into how much per-capita costs were equivalent to in terms of the hourly wage income of an industrial worker. The index numbers varied from forty minutes to more than twenty hours.

Recently, I revisited that data in context of recent efforts toward comparing countries on their corruption incidence. These have produced the rankings that Johan Graf Lambsdorff and TI have developed on the basis of world wide rankings of corruption incidence by business men and other observers collected by business information services.

To my astonishment I did find a consistent relationship between the two quite different rankings, based on observations made 35 years apart. With two exceptions, those of India and Israel, the rank order of the countries on the two very different scales are similar and symmetrical. Why do seven of the nine cases show such a strong linear fit, given that most of the corruption perception ratings are of behavior of bureaucrats who are probably extracting bribes for their personal use, rather than passing funds on to parties?⁶

An initial thesis for how the relationship is demonstrated over time, would postulate that the parties' need for money leads to institutionalized ways of favor trading, which encourages or condones corrupt exchanges even in arenas relatively remote from partisan campaign politics. Party finance may not rely predominantly on quid-pro quo contributions, but to the extent that some are included, they may symbolize societal toleration of exploiting public offices for individual private benefit. There are surely other contributing explanations, which might perhaps be explored via survey research methods.

Looking at the two extreme cases in the graph, one can explain the contrasts between Australia and the Philippines as polar examples of the intensity and efficacy of monitoring and prosecution of potential corrupt activity. The Philippines combine and magnify the corruption inducing

tendencies of candidate centered politics of the American and Latin types. Clientelistic politics predominate in appeals to a geo-politically heterogeneous electorate which has inhibited the formation of mass parties. Australia by contrast inherited the world's first electorally successful working-class mass party in a political culture where 'mateship' ideology probably facilitated various forms of favoritism. Australian states have, in recent decades implemented relatively massive anti-corruption control programs, like the New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption, whose efficacy in mobilizing taboos against even marginal favor giving by civil servants may have helped to produce the favorable Australian rating achieved in the corruption perception indexes.

We may also speculate about why we find Japan along the regression line with a placement higher than the US, but so much lower than Italy? It seems that we may partly attribute the lower U.S. ranking to the fact that whereas American party factions compete with each other, they do not do so in the general elections within the same electoral districts, as was the case in the other two countries. In turn the Italian corruption perception index was probably higher than the Japanese because of the way in which sectors of the public administration were colonized by particular parties to a degree not so apparent in Japan.

The much greater vulnerability to corruption charges of Italian parties may be attributed to lesser efficacy of legal and institutional controls over practices by cartel parties. Lacking the kinds of built-in class and religious-based moral monitoring found more efficacious in North Europe, Italian society was unable to keep dominant clientelistic relations from infiltrating both the party and bureaucratic components. The resultant partial fusion of the two sectors distinguished it from Japan, where larger parts of the national bureaucracy were long able to keep somewhat aloof from the contract kickbacks and similar corrupt practices. To the extent that some were indiscreet in gift-taking practices, the bureaucrats have more recently also had to accept their share of opprobrium.

India and Israel: To explain the outlier status of these two countries, we can begin by noting that they became generally distinguished during most of the period since the 1960's, by inclusion into their systems of many new ethnic groups, and their political parties. These were able to wrest national political supremacy from previously dominant parties which had earlier perpetuated more West European political and bureaucratic models, but also tolerating increasing corruption.

By the 1990's, after two generations of achieving independence from British control, it is evident that the two countries excelled in setting different kinds of world records: Israel for party and campaign expenditures, and India for the reputation having a most thoroughly corrupt democratic regime.

The record which Israel posted in the 1990's with regard to party and campaign expenditures, are partly as a result of public subsidies which are the highest in the world, and three times those of Germany on a per-capita basis. Campaign expenditures reached a total of \$20 per capita in the 1992 national elections. "While the influence of big money was severely limited in inter-party competition, new avenues of corruption were opened in internal party primaries", (Hoffnung, 146) leading to per-capita party spending of \$38, in the municipal elections of 1993.

Whereas corruption charges contributed to erosion of the Labor party's dominance in Israel in the 1970's, the much more dramatic Indian development has led to the conclusion that "the Neruvian State" itself "institutionalized corruption." Subsequent grace and favor from government leaders led to pervasive corruption at all levels of government. In Congress's 1989 campaign, a poster showed Rajiv Ghandi as Pinocchio with a nose resembling a long Bofors gun (Singh 213-218), an allusion to the huge bribe paid by the Swedish arms manufacturer to the Ghandi family.

If one asks what inhibited massive corruption in Israel, part of the answer may be that economic position of the poorer Israeli immigrants was considerably above that of the Indian masses, where "the corruption of the poor and their leaders is a necessary strategy of their survival" (Singh 219). In Israel extensive courting of the newer electorates was largely made feasible by public party subsidies, and experiences there were linked to a renewed trend towards "catch all" parties and meant to demonstrate that "cartel party formation can be arrested or even reversed" (Mendilow 270).

Toward Some Concluding Theses

Although I really lack data and techniques too fully demonstrate it, the above data and interpretation would seem to sustain the thesis that the strongly positive correlation between campaign expenditures and corruption along the Australia – Philippines axis is the predominant pattern. Given the temporal lag between the two data sets, one can conclude, at a minimum, that the implication that campaign expenditures induced higher corruption incidence is fairly strong.

An India-Israel Axis? Should the three countries of India, Italy and Israel also be treated as a potential axis? The question is worth pondering. But it may be that Israel is unique in having to be analyzed in exogenous terms that go beyond the characteristics of the national party systems or even the national political systems. This uniqueness can be attributed partly to the predominance of the military, and the security for which only it can vouch. This would go far to explain why among all its scandals, Israel never suffered the equivalent of a Bofors or Lockheed affair. Whereas the security concern was regionally focused, the related economic goal of becoming a center of technological innovation, evolved within a global context. Thus the drive to make Israel second only to California as a center of advanced technical innovation put a much greater premium on the suppression of corruption tendencies in defense and other technology contracts. So are Israel as well as India may be both exceptional cases, which just happen to align with Italy in this curious way?

Cartel Partisan Corruption: Ostrogorski might be delighted to hear that critics of the emergence of so called cartel parties declare themselves as continuing his wariness about the evolution from party government to "the party state". Ideological statements such as those alluding to an "invasion of the state by the parties" (Mair, Katz) seem to follow in his footsteps, and those of some earlier American Progressives. These recent hard-nosed European academic analyses seem to have emerged especially in the wake of the implosion of the Italian party system in the early 1990's. Will the way that social scientists from other countries have shared in the fascination with the Italian case lead them to become more like some groups of party politicians in having their respective 'Toskana Fraktion'?

But how well do other European parties in cartel party systems sustain a more generalized thesis? Some aspects of the Flick case can be used to argue that the German development supported such a thesis for while such a thesis, but other consequences of the Constitutional court's interpretation of the Parties law can be used to sustain the case of supporting continued competition. If the Scandinavian party systems are perceived as strong examples of cartelized party systems, then their relative lack of corruption incidence would impede the development of a causal thesis. But how many Denmark's does it take to counterbalance one Italy?

Religion and Size: Within Western Europe the strongest contrast in corruption correlation that seems to emerge from the Lambsdorff data is the one between the high corruption rankings of the large, predominantly Catholic countries, and the low rankings of small, predominantly Protestant ones. In the northern countries both the religious influence on rights and duties of citizenship, combined with the greater visibility due to size, probably contribute

to more effective monitoring. Banfield would hardly have found a Montegrano in Finland or Norway; there patronage and clientelist relationships had been largely transmuted. But our interest in capturing these differences at the levels of parties is impeded by the fact that in most relevant countries the previously distinct Catholic and Protestant parties have generally been fused into inter-denominational Christian Democratic parties.

A Rent by any Other Name: A concluding thesis might consider what Max Weber would have to say about the surprisingly ambiguous role that the current American party system is playing in the comparative discussion. What would he make for instance of a recent *New York Times*' editorial which bemoaned that "It took nearly 75 years for the United States to enact laws protecting elections from the corrupting influence of campaign contributions. But it has taken only four years to eviscerate those reforms" (NYT, 10 October 1998). Since American lawyers and judges had helped unravel the most recent attempts at legislative party finance regulation, whence would he think the best advice might be solicited – from the Germans, the British, or maybe the Danes?


Gentlemen, he might reply, I would like nothing better to help the leading power of western capitalism to find an effective way of coping with the "soft money" problem as we enter the new millennium. But while some of the ill effects of American profligacy have not been borne out in just the way I anticipated when I visited the St. Louis World's Fair in 1905 I doubt whether any Europeans can offer good advice from their experiences. It seems to me that the low efficiency of the U.S. legislative-judicial machinery, can be largely attributed first, to the U.S. persisting in leading the world in the over-production of lawyers, and secondly, to its inability to create a system of responsible parties, as its wise elders had prescribed at mid-century; and thirdly, to its unique undermining of the distinctions between public and private spheres that is so crucial for the identification and suppression of corruption. As one of your pundits might put it: When Lincoln's bedroom is for rent to the highest bidder, who can expect rent control to be effective in any part of the political sector?

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Party Expenditures, c. 1960 and Corruption Incidence Perceptions, 1995-97



Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Noah H. Evans, September 18, 1998

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ENDNOTES

¹ See Heidenheimer, Johnston, LeVine, eds. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, 1989: 4-6.

² A sketch of major developments: Indirect subventions/ court 1954, ordered replaced 1958; Direct subsidies introduced 1959, declared invalid 1966; Election reimbursements 1967, coupled with the tight limits: 1989 -1989 tax deductibility limits raised to DM120,000; 1992 – invalidation of high deductible limits as well as of a equalizing formula. (Poguntke 192-193).

³ By means of donations the Flick corporation has systematically gained spheres of influence, so that it must be stated the political corruption on a large scale is involved, regardless of whether the punishable act of bribery or corruptibility has been realized in one case or another. By means of the conspiratorial money distributed by the Flick Corporation, the benefiting parties gained a remarkable financial advantage compared to their political competitors.

⁴ German subsidies increased from about one-third to about 45% over the 1974-87 period, while the Italian share decreased from 55-60% to the 40-45% range. (Landfried, 117).

⁵ In both Germany and the United States numerous academic specialists on party systems and party finance were accused of excessive tolerance of the status quo. Those attacked were often political scientists, while the critics came more from among scholars with legal credentials and administrative experience. Given the broader tradition of American preoccupation with corruption, the US has also begun to generate some academics who have specialized in identifying the high cost of corruption control measures in terms of the wastage of administrative resources.

⁶ Party Campaign Expenditures and Corruption Incidences

Country	Party Campaign Expenditure Index, early 1960s	& Corruption Index 1995-97	Perception
Australia	0.45	8.75	
United Kingdom	0.64	8.41	
Germany	0.95	8.21	
United States	1.12	7.69	
India	1.25	2.55	
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